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Abstract—Software developers share programming solutions in Q&A sites like Stack Overflow. The reuse of crowd-sourced code
snippets can facilitate rapid prototyping. However, recent research shows that the shared code snippets may be of low quality and can
even contain vulnerabilities. This paper aims to understand the nature and the prevalence of security vulnerabilities in crowd-sourced
code examples. To achieve this goal, we investigate security vulnerabilities in the C++ code snippets shared on Stack Overflow over a
period of 10 years. In collaborative sessions involving multiple human coders, we manually assessed each code snippet for security
vulnerabilities following CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) guidelines. From the 72,483 reviewed code snippets used in at least
one project hosted on GitHub, we found a total of 69 vulnerable code snippets categorized into 29 types. Many of the investigated code
snippets are still not corrected on Stack Overflow. The 69 vulnerable code snippets found in Stack Overflow were reused in a total of
2859 GitHub projects. To help improve the quality of code snippets shared on Stack Overflow, we developed a browser extension that
allow Stack Overflow users to check for vulnerabilities in code snippets when they upload them on the platform.
Index Terms—Stack Overflow, Software Security, C++, SOTorrent, Vulnerability Migration, GitHub, Vulnerability Evolution
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A major goal of software development is to deliver high
quality software in timely and cost-efficient manner. Code
reuse is an accepted practice and an essential approach to
achieve this premise [1]. The reused code snippets come
from many different sources and in different forms, e.g.,
third-party library [2], open source software [3], and Ques-
tion and Answer (Q&A) websites such as Stack Overflow
[4], [5]. Sharing code snippets and code examples is also a
common learning practice [6]. Novices and even more senior
developers leverage code examples and explanations shared
on platforms like Stack Overflow, to learn how to perform
new programming tasks or use certain APIs [1], [7], [8], [9].
Multiple studies [10], [11], [12] have investigated knowledge
flow and knowledge sharing from Stack Overflow answers
to repositories of open source software hosted in GitHub.
They report that code snippets found on Stack Overflow
can be toxic, i.e., of poor quality, and can potentially lead to
license violations [12]. An important aspect of quality that
has not been investigated in details by the research commu-
nity is security. If vulnerable codes snippets are migrated
from Stack Overflow to applications, these applications will
be prone to attacks.
Most studies published on security aspects of code snip-
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pets posted on Stack Overflow focused on Java and Python;
overlooking C++ which is the fourth most popular pro-
gramming language [13]. C++ is the language of choice
for embedded, resource-constrained programs. It is also
extensively used in large and distributed systems. Vulner-
abilities in C++ code snippets are therefore likely to have
a major impact. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no study has examined the security aspects of C++ Stack
overflow code snippets. This paper aims to fill this gap
in the literature. More specifically, we aim to understand
the nature and the prevalence of security vulnerabilities
in code examples shared on Stack Overflow. To achieve
this goal, we empirically study C++ vulnerabilities in code
examples shared in Stack Overflow along the following two
dimensions:
• Prevalence. We review the C++ vulnerability types con-
tained in a Stack Overflow data-set named SOTOR-
RENT [14], [15] and analyze their evolution over time;
in particular their migration to GitHub projects.
From 72,483 C++ code snippets reused in at least one
GitHub project we found 69 vulnerabilities belonging
to 29 different types of vulnerabilities.
• Propagation. We investigate how the vulnerable code
snippets were reused in GitHub repositories.
The 69 identified vulnerable code snippets are used
in 2589 GitHub files. The most common vulnerability
propagated from Stack Overflow to GitHub is CWE-
150 (Improper neutralization of space, meta, or control
space).
To assist developers in reusing code from stack Overflow
safely, we developed a Chrome extension that allow check-
ing for vulnerabilities in code snippets when they are up-
loaded on Stack Overflow.
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2TABLE 1: Research contributions made in this paper to understand The prevalence and propagation of C++ vulnerabilities in
crowd-Sourced code examples
Type Research Contribution Research Advancement
Prevalence:
Empirical
Evidence
from Stack
Overflow
Evidence of the Prevalence of Vulnerable C++ Code
in Stack Overflow. We analyzed C++ code snippets
contained in answers posted on Stack Overflow and
identified the vulnerabilities that they contain.
Reusability in software is a very high-profile issue, which has been highlighted
by many studies [1] [2] [3] [4], [5] [6]. In this study, we try to highlight the
programming language of C++ and its use in Software environment, because C++
language is still widely used in large industrial systems [16], [17]. Our study has
been conducted to improve the quality of C++ code snippets shared on online
forums like Stack Overflow.
Propagation:
Empirical
Evidence
from Stack
Overflow
and GitHub
Evidence of the propagation of Vulnerable C++ Code
snippets from Stack Overflow to GitHub Repositories.
We tracked all the vulnerable C++ code snippets found
on Stack Overflow to their reusing projects on GitHub.
We conducted a survey of GitHub developers who
copied Vulnerable Code from Stack Overflow to their
GitHub repositories.
One of the challenges in software is the reuse of vulnerable codes to accelerate
the development of a software product, which ultimately leads to a decrease
in software quality [8], [9]. Through this study, we aim to inform programmers
and developers about the risks of reusing vulnerable code snippets from Stack
Overflow.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides background information about code reuse
and discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces
our research questions and data collection and data pro-
cessing. Section 4 and Section 5 discusses obtained results,
while Section 6 discusses the implications of our findings.
Section 7 discusses threats to the validity of our study and
Section 8 concludes the paper; outlining some avenues for
future works.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide background information about
security vulnerabilities and review the related literature.
2.1 CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE is a community-developed list of common software
security weaknesses. It serves as a common reference, a
measuring stick for software security tools, and as a base-
line for weakness identification, mitigation, and prevention
efforts. It is regarded as an universal online dictionary of
weaknesses that have been found in computer software. The
purpose of CWE is to facilitate the effective use of tools
that can identify, find and resolve bugs, vulnerabilities and
exposures, in computer software before the programs are
distributed to the public.
2.2 Reusing of Code Shared in Stack Overflow
Stack Overflow is regarded as the most popular question
and answer website for software developers [15]. Software
developers benefit from SO posts, while programming [8],
[12], [18], [19], [20], and read about the technologies and
tools needed for development [21], [22], [23]. Thus, research
on Stack Overflow is of high importance in software com-
munity.
Developers create and maintain software by standing on
the shoulders of others [24]; they reuse components and
libraries, and mine the Web for information that can help
them in their tasks [25]. For help with their code, developers
often turn to programming question and answer (Q&A)
communities, most visible of which is Stack Overflow [26],
[27].
Xia et al. [11] show that a large number of open source
systems reuse outdated third-party libraries which can lead
to harmful effects to the software because they may intro-
duce security flaws in the software.
Abdalkareem et al. [1] examined F-Droid repositories, and
identified clones between Stack Overflow posts and An-
droid apps. They observed that copied code from SO posts
can have an adverse effect on the quality of applications.
Yang et al. [10] analyzed 909k non-fork Python projects
hosted on GitHub, which contain 290M function defini-
tions, and 1.9M Python snippets captured in Stack Overflow
and performed a quantitative analysis of block-level code
cloning intra and inter Stack Overflow and GitHub.
Akanda Nishi et al. [28] studied code duplication between
two popular sources of software development information:
the Stack Overflow Q&A site and software development
tutorials, to understand the evolution of duplicated infor-
mation overtime.
An et al. [20] investigated clones between 399 Android
apps and Stack Overflow posts. They found 1,226 code
snippets which were reused from 68 Android apps. This
reused of code snippets resulted in 1,279 cases of potential
license violations.
2.3 Security challenges of Stack Overflow code snip-
pets
Several studies have reported the presence of insecure
code in highly up-voted, and accepted answers on Stack
Overflow [8], [29], [30]. However, these studies did not
investigated C++ code snippets. Yet, C++ is the fourth
most popular programming language. The use of insecure
code snippets has been linked to multiple software attacks
in which user credentials, credit card numbers, and other
private information were stolen [31]. C++ is reported to
3TABLE 2: Comparison between our study and prior studies
Theme Our Study Prior Study Comparison
Reusability of
C++ Posts in
Stack Overflow
In this study we investigated the
reusability of C++ code snippets
from Stack Overflow answer posts to
GitHub projects.
Reusability in Stack Overflow contain copying
code in other open sources application, license
violation in Stack Overflow and use in open source
projects such as GitHub repositories [8] , [19],
[25], [26]. The studies [10], [11], [12], [20] included
reusability in Java and Android application, [1],
[40] in Python, [28] in Third party code, [41] in
IDE, [42] in API documentation, [43] in Php.
This study indicates the reusabil-
ity of Stack Overflow C++ codes to
GitHub projects and the prevalence
of these codes in GitHub repositories
that until now not mentioned.
Security of C++
Posts in Stack
Overflow
Software security is a very broad
and, at the same time, extremely
difficult to detect specially for C++
programming language. We analyze
C++ code snippets in Stack Over-
flow answer posts.
Studies [8], [29] in java Script and android appli-
cation, [7], [30], [35] in java and [23] in python
showed the Stack Overflow have a security vul-
nerability in their code snippets that uses in appli-
cations, open source projects, and APIs.
We carefully scrutinized the vulner-
ability and expressed each of them
with a CWE vulnerability label of
the C++ code in Stack Overflow an-
swer posts so far no study has been
conducted in this area.
Security
in GitHub
Repositories
This study shows all possible vul-
nerable C++ GitHub projects used
Stack Overflow vulnerable code
snippets.
Study about analysis of security in GitHub projects
contain secure coding, sentiment analysis, security
issues [36], [37], [38], [39].
No studies exists specifically ad-
dresses the C++ vulnerable GitHub
projects that migrated from Stack
Overflow codes.
be prone to misuses (e.g., memory corruption bugs) that
can easily lead to vulnerable code and exploitable applica-
tions [32], [33], [34].
Fischer et al. [8] found insecure code snippets from Stack
Overflow copied into 196,403 Android applications, pub-
lished on Google Play.
Zhang et al. [35] investigated the quality of Stack Overflow
code snippets by examining the misuse of API calls. They
reported that approximately 31% of their analysed code
snippets possibly incorporate API misuses that could lead
to failures and–or resource leakages.
2.4 Security issues in GitHub
Rahman et al. [36] detected seven types of security smells
that are indicative of security weaknesses in IaC scripts and
identified 21,201 occurrences of security smells that include
1326 occurrences of hard-coded passwords.
Zahedi et al. [37] examined issue topics in GitHub reposito-
ries and found that only 3% of them were related to security.
The majority of these security issues were cryptography
issues.
Pletea et al. [38] examined security-related discussions on
GitHub, and report that they represent approximately 10%
of all discussions on GitHub. They also report that security
related discussions are often associated with negative emo-
tions.
Acar et al. [39] conducted an experiment with active GitHub
users to examine the validity of recruiting convenience sam-
ples in security-related study. They observed that neither
the self-reported status of participants (i.e., as student or
professional developers) nor the security background of
the participants correlated with their capacity to complete
security tasks successfully.
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DATA COLLECTION
3.1 Research Questions
We explore the following Research Questions (RQs):
RQ1: How prevalent are C++ vulnerabilities in Stack
Overflow code snippets?
Previous work on other programming languages revealed
the existence of vulnerable code in Stack Overflow [7] [44].
To understand the existence and distribution of insecure
C++ codes in Stack Overflow, we reviewed and analyzed
C++ answer posts throughout the ten years of Stack Over-
flow history stored in SOTorrent that had link to GitHub
projects.
RQ2: How are the vulnerable C++ code exampled shared
in Stack Overflow reused in GitHub repositories?
Knowledge sharing by code reuse routinely occurs between
Stack Overflow and GitHub. The effect of vulnerable code
migration to GitHub projects have not been investigated in
any programming languages so far. Detected C++ vulnera-
ble Stack Overflow code snippets might have migrated to
GitHub and ended up deployed in the field. This research
question aims to examine the extent of this phenomenon.
3.2 Data collection
In this section, we describe the data collection and analy-
sis approaches that we used to answer our two research
questions. Figure 1 shows a general overview of our data
processing approach. We will describe each step in our data
processing approach. The corresponding data and scripts
are available at [45].
To study Stack Overflow posts evolution and their rela-
tion with GitHub, SOTorrent data-set Version 2018-09-23 has
been used. This version of SOTorrent contains posts from
2008 until 2018. In total there are 41,472,536 question and
answer posts and 109,385,095 post version with 206,560,269
post block versions containing 6,039,434 links to software
projects. There are 3,861,573 links to public GitHub reposi-
tories.
4Fig. 1: Overall steps in case study
Fig. 2: Structure of SOTorrent posts
SOTorrent provides access to the version history of Stack
Overflow content for ten years. As shown in Figure 2,
whole post, individual text or code snippet can be accessed
independently. According to Figure 3, SOTorrent connects
code snippets from Stack Overflow posts to other platforms
by aggregating URLs from surrounding text blocks and
comments and by collecting references from GitHub files
to Stack Overflow posts [14], [15].
Fig. 3: Connection of SOTorrent table to other resources
3.3 Data Preprocessing
The total count of questions with C++ tag was 583,415 out of
16,389,567. These questions had 1,074,990 answers, includ-
ing previous and modified versions. A total of 1,738,346
version histories existed. As shown in Figure 5, at least 50%
of the posts in the Stack Overflow only had one edit in their
context.
Our study aimed to analyze code snippets that migrated
to GitHub; therefore, answers without code snippets were
removed. Answers with one or more code snippets summed
up to 1,032,696. The count of answers that migrated to
GitHub and had C++ tag was 1,770. These 1,770 C++ an-
swers have been referenced in 14,779 GitHub files. These
14,779 references came from 8,172 unique projects. The
distribution of GitHub files in GitHub projects is shown in
Figure 4. A vulnerability might exist in older versions of a
code snippet in an answer, and a developer might copied
that vulnerable code snippet into a GitHub file at that time.
So we had to also analyze older versions of code snippets
too. Including older versions of the code snippets, of these
answers there were 121,892 possible cases of migrations
from code snippets to GitHub.
Fig. 4: Distribution of GitHub URLs in GitHub projects
Fig. 5: Count of Edits, GithubUrls and Code Blocks for
answers post
3.4 Data cleaning
Not all code snippets in SOTorrent were actually C++ codes.
Figure 7 shows a tagged code snippet supposed to be C++.
Other examples of pseudo codes or plain texts tagged as
code snippet could be found.
5Fig. 6: Distribution of CWE’s and Vulnerable Answers by
year
Fig. 7: Example of code snippet in answer with no real
c++ code, but only configuration of ‘makefile‘ - Answer id
13109884
Syntaxnet, a natural language processing tool was used to
detect code snippets that had actual C++ codes. Syntaxnet
is one of the most accurate parsers available [46]. The main
difference between Syntaxnet and other NLP tools is that
Syntaxnet does not use the meaning of the sentence, but
also considers the words independent of each other. Among
121,892 possible code snippets only 72,483 code snippets
were actually C++ code snippets included in 1,325 answers.
At SOTorrent, each change in question or answer in Stack
Overflow is stored as a set of records but links to GitHub
projects are only provided just at the answer level. There-
fore, we must review all the code snippets within SOTorrent
for vulnerabilities but to investigate the migration we have
to follow the link to GitHub at the answer level of the
code snippet. SourcererCC [47] was used to find cloned
code snippets with exact similarity (Type-1 clone) and 2,056
different sets of similar code snippets within SOTorrent
were identified. This makes vulnerability assessments more
efficient. On the other hand, when a vulnerability is found
in a clone, all the similar clones have the same vulnerability.
Afterwards, we can find out possible dangerous migrations
in links to GitHub projects provided at the answer level of
all the similar code snippet.
4 PREVALENCE OF C++ VULNERABILITIES IN
STACK OVERFLOW CODE EXAMPLES (RQ1)
4.1 Approach
In order to make the review process more efficient and
systematic we created a web application having a simple
interface with language-specific syntax highlighting. The
web-based review application could mark code snippets as
vulnerable, assign one or more CWE tags for each code
snippet and view all similar code of a same answer at once.
Fig. 8: Flowchart of code reviewing in first step
Three experienced master students (first, third and sixth
authors) in C++ security issues were chosen to review each
code snippets. As shown in previous section, only 2,056
unique code snippets needed to be reviewed. The reviewers
tagged the vulnerabilities by appropriate CWE’s.
At the first step of manual inspection process, the goal was
to reduce data-set size without losing accuracy. Thus, all
code snippets that were certainly not vulnerable were re-
moved, As shown in Figure 8, our three reviewers inspected
the code snippets and marked any possible vulnerable
code snippet as vulnerable code. If a vulnerability within
a code snippet was noticeable within first round of review,
They would write a short description explaining why they
thought the code snippet might be vulnerable. The specific
steps that were followed are described below. This process
took 868 hours. In contrast, code snippets not having a
specific functionality or which were only used for teaching
purposes (and did not have vulnerabilities) were removed.
During the review process, reviewers were directly in con-
tact with each other and solved their disagreement through
discussions. According to Fleiss’ Kappa [48] we calculate
Cohen’s Kappa [48] score agreement between three raters
0.26 that is a fair agreement. After this first stage of thorough
code review, 498 possible vulnerable code snippets were
detected. The first round of review was presented to author
2, a professor in software security for validation. A group
meeting of 12 graduate students who previously had system
and/or software security courses at graduate level finalized
the first round of review.
The second round of review process was more robust and
followed a self-established guidelines. In order to find vul-
nerabilities in answers, reviewers needed to indulge deeper
into the process and have a better understanding of code
snippets and its evolution. Based on knowledge obtained
from first round of review, we established a set of guidelines
6explained bellow to find as many vulnerabilities in the code
snippets as possible and not miss any.
1) Read the corresponding question to answer with the
probable vulnerable code snippet: To have a better
understanding of the reasons why developers shared
the code snippet on Stack Overflow.
2) Read last version of answer, its description and ana-
lyze evolution of code over time: To find out whether
the vulnerability has been fixed or evolved within the
various versions.
3) Read comments of answers: To find out if the vul-
nerability has been reported through comments of the
post. As an example, in Figure 9, 1st and 2nd comments
indicated a vulnerability, and 3rd and 4th comments
indicated deprecated answer. Source code of answer is
also included in listing 1.
Fig. 9: Comments to vulnerable Answer in Stack overflow
with id (440240)
4) Look for deprecated or dangerous functions in code
snippet: For example ‘rand()‘ function is obsoleted
since C++11 [49] and it is not recommended for
random-number generation and cryptographic opera-
tions.
5) Check the arguments passed to the functions in the
code snippet: Types of arguments and their values are
very important. For example, an out-of-bound large un-
signed integer passed to a function that accepts signed
integers may interpret the value as a negative number
which results in an undefined behaviour or a program
crash.
6) Check function usages based on official documen-
tations: For referencing and proper documentation
of found vulnerabilities, official documentations were
extensively used throughout the review process. For
example in listing 2, return value of malloc was not
checked.
7) Look for logical vulnerabilities in code snippets.
Usually security is not the first priority of answerers in
Stack Overflow. Answerers focus more on functionality
than security. For example in listing 5, the goal is to read
a vector, but no bounds checking is performed. Using
a larger value than index bound can happen either by
a programming mistake or could be the doing of an
attacker.
After the second round of review process, the identified
vulnerable code snippets were confirmed and tagged based
on CWE’s. One or multiple CWE tag(s) were assigned
to each code snippet. These tags allowed us to track the
evolution of the security of the code snippets throughout
the evolution of Stack Overflow.
4.2 Results
Overall, the distribution of all C++ answers from 2008 to
2018 is shown in Figure 11. If one hypothesizes that Stack
Overflow usage reflects the popularity of the programming
language, C++ has been the most popular programming
language in 2013, and its usage declined after that. The
distribution of Stack Overflow answers linked to GitHub
projects by year, also shown in Figure 11, again shows that
in 2013, C++ had the most migrations to GitHub projects.
From our manual reviews of the code snippets, we found 99
vulnerable code snippets residing in 69 answers. By looking
at the distribution of vulnerable answers, we find that most
vulnerable answers were created in 2011 (as shown in Figure
10). The frequency of CWE’s in code snippets is presented
in Figure 12. CWE-1006 and CWE-754 are the most frequent
ones. The list of CWEs that have been found is explained
in Table 3. A complete description of CWE’s can be found
at [50]. In the following, we present some examples of
vulnerabilities found in the inspected code snippets.
Fig. 10: Frequency of CWEs in Each Answer
Fig. 11: Distribution of answers in C++ by year
Listing 1: Generate random string in C++ - Answer id 440240 in Stack overflow,
shows vulnerability due to use rand function with incorrect using method,
(CWE-1006, CWE-477, CWE-193, CWE-754)
void alphanum [ gen random (char *s, const int len) ] {
static const char alphanum[] =
”0123456789”
”ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ”
”abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz”;
for ( int i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
s[ i ] = alphanum[ rand()% ( sizeof(alphanum)−1)];
}
s[len] = 0;
}
7TABLE 3: The different types of CWE C++ vulnerabilities and their frequency as we observed in our dataset of Stack
Overflow Answers. Each tick in X-axis denotes the last one/two letters of a year, e.g., 8 for 2008 to 16 for 2016.
CWE Title and Description Frequency by Year
20
Improper input validation:
When software does not validate input properly, an attacker is able to craft the input in a form that is not
expected by the rest of the application. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1
5
78
OS command injection:
Constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, that
could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2
116
Improper encoding or escaping of output
A structured message is prepared to communicate with another component, but encoding or escaping of the
data is either missing or done incorrectly.
10
2
121
Stack base buffer overflow
The situation is where the buffer is rewritten in the stack (like, a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a
function). 8 9
1
125 Out-of-bounds ReadThe software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. 16
1
131 Incorrect calculation of buffer sizeDoes not correctly calculate the size to be used when allocating a buffer, which could lead to a buffer overflow. 13
1
134
Use of externally controlled format string
Have been used a function that accepts a format string as an argument, but the format string originates from an
external source.
9 11
12
754
Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
This vulnerability occurs based on the assumption that events or specific circumstances never happen, such as
low memory conditions, lack of access to resources. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1
5
158
Improper neutralization of null byte or null character
The input is received from a upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes when
null bytes are sent to a downstream component. 8 11 12 15
12
190
Integer overflow or wraparound
Perform a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound, when the calculation is used for
resource management or execution control. 11
1
193
Off by one error
A product calculates or uses an incorrect maximum or minimum value that is 1 more, or 1 less, than the correct
value. 8
1
789 Uncontrolled memory allocationMemory is allocated based on invalid size and allowing arbitrary amounts of memory to be allocated. 8 9 10 11 12 13
12
252 Unchecked return valueThe return value is not checked by a method or function, which may create an unexpected state. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1
4
1006
Bad Coding Practices
These weaknesses are deemed to cause exploitation’s that are not vulnerable by self but indicate that the
application is not developed carefully. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1
6
1019
Validate input Weaknesses
Weaknesses are related to the design and architecture of a system’s input validation components that could lead
to a degradation of the quality of data flow in a system. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1
6
415
Double free
Called free() twice on the same memory address, potentially leading to modification of unexpected memory
locations. 8 9
1
426
Untrusted search path
The application searches for critical resources using an externally-supplied search path that can point to resources
that are not under the application’s direct control. 10
1
476
Null pointer deference
A NULL pointer dereference occurs when dereference a pointer that it expects to be valid, but is NULL, typically
causing a crash or exit. 9 11
1
477
Use of obsolete function
The code uses deprecated or obsolete functions, which suggests that the code has not been actively reviewed or
maintained.
8 9 10 11 12 13
12
628
Function call with incorrect specific arguments
The product calls a function, procedure, or routine with arguments that are not correctly specified, leading to
always-incorrect behavior and resultant weaknesses. 8 9
1
120
Classic buffer overflow
Been copied an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than
the size of the output buffer. 9
1
676 Use of potentially dangerous functionInvoked a potentially dangerous function that could introduce a vulnerability if it is used incorrectly. 8 12
1
682
Incorrect calculation
Perform a calculation that generates incorrect or unintended results that are later used in security-critical
decisions or resource management.
8
1
686
Function call with incorrect argument type
A function, procedure, or procedure is called up with arguments that are not properly specified, resulting in
always mistaken behavior and resulting weaknesses. 10 15
1
8Continuation of Table 5: The different types of CWE C++ vulnerabilities and their frequency as we observed in our dataset
of Stack Overflow Answers. Each tick in X-axis denotes the last one/two letters of a year, e.g., 8 for 2008 to 16 for 2016.
CWE Title and Description Frequency by Year
710 Improper adherence to coding standardsNot followed certain coding rules for development, which can lead to resultant weaknesses. 11
1
150
Improper neutralization of escape, meta, or control sequence
The software receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes
special elements when they are sent to a downstream component.
11
1
758
Reliance on Undefined unspecific or implementation defined behavior˜
Used an API function, data structure, in a way that relies on properties that are not always guaranteed to hold
for that entity. 10 11
1
232
Improper handling of undefined values
Does not handled or incorrectly handled when a value is not defined or supported for the associated parameter,
field, or argument name. 8
1
835 loop with unreachable exit conditionThe program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. 8
2
369
Divide by zero
Typically occurs when an unexpected value is provided to the product, or an error occurs that is not properly
detected. 8 9
1
413
Improper resource locking
The software does not lock or does not correctly lock a resource when the software must have exclusive access
to the resource. 8
1
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Fig. 12: Frequency of CWEs in code snippets
This code snippet of answer 440240 shown in Listing 1
can be dangerous. Functions with count parameters like
‘len‘ should take into account the terminating ‘NULL‘ as
an extra character. But this function actually writes into
the character ‘len+1‘ when executing s[len] = 0. That is
CWE- 193: Off-by-one-error vulnerability [51] that may
lead to unpredictable behaviour, memory corruption and
application crash. If one pays special attention and always
passes the length a number at maximum one less than the
desired, the function works correctly, otherwise we have
off-by-one error.
Line ‘s[i] = alphanum[rand() % sizeof(alphanum) - 1]‘
is faulty since size of ‘alphanum‘ is ‘63‘, where the last
character in the string indexed 69th is ‘NULL‘. Therefore,
once in a while a NULL may be included in the generated
’random’ string. This vulnerability can be categorized as
’CWE-754: Improper check for unusual or exceptional
conditions’ [52], where an improper number may be
used as a return of a function leading to a crash or other
unintended behaviours. Another appropriate category is
’CWE-1006: Bad coding practices’. Stated differently, a
generated random string with this algorithm may include
‘NULL‘ in the middle of string.
Moreover, ‘rand()‘ is an obsolete function in C and C++. So
another vulnerability category is ’CWE-477: Use of obsolete
function’ a major degradation in software quality. Another
vulnerability exists within the code since the developer did
not use a random seed before calling the function. Thus, the
generated random number is not ’random’ at all. Moreover,
‘rand() % mod‘ is not a good practice since it returns lower
bits which are not again random [53].
Listing 2: Execute functor in given thread in QT - Answer id 21653558 in Stack
overflow, shows vulnerability due to use malloc function without checking return
special condition, (CWE-1006, CWE-252, CWE-789, CWE-476)
class FunctorCallEvent: public QMetaCallEvent {
public:
template <typename Functor>
FunctorCallEvent(Functor && fun, QObject * receiver) :
QMetaCallEvent(new QtPrivate::QFunctorSlotObject<Functor,
0, typename QtPrivate::List Left<void, 0>::Value, void>
(std :: forward<Functor>(fun)), receiver, 0,
0,0,( void**) malloc (sizeof(void*)));
Another vulnerability is shown in Listing 2 of answer
21653558. The code snippet in this answer uses ‘malloc‘ to
allocate memory and passes its pointer to a function in QT
library that requires a valid pointer. malloc return pointer
may be set to NULL in case of malloc failure. Thus, the
return pointer from malloc must be checked even if the
amount of memory requested is small [54]. In this example,
return value of malloc is not checked. This vulnerability is
called CWE-252 [55]; Unchecked return value. In case of
malloc failure null pointer dereference occurs.
9Listing 3: Execute command and get output - Answer id 478960 in Stack overflow,
Execute function in given thread in QT - Answer id 21653558 in Stack overflow,
shows vulnerability due to OS command injection because user input are in-
volved, (CWE-78, CWE-1019)
std :: string exec(const char* cmd) {
std :: shared ptr<FILE> pipe(popen ( cmd , ”r”), pclose);
if (! pipe) return ”ERROR”;
char buffer[128];
std :: string result = ””;
while (! feof (pipe.get () ) ) {
if ( fgets (buffer , 128, pipe.get () ) != NULL)
result += buffer;
}
return result ;
}
The function shown in Listing 3 is vulnerable to code
injection (OS command injection) attacks since user inputs
commands are inputted and not checked. In other words,
any command with privilege level of the program can be
executed without any errors or warnings.
Listing 4: Set the global LUA PATH variable programmatically - Answer id
4156038 in Stack overflow, shows vulnerability due to second arg in this function
may contain multiple path separated by ”;” (CWE-754, CWE-252, CWE-426)
int setLuaPath( lua State* L, const char* path ){
lua getglobal( L, ”package” );
lua getfield ( L, −1, ”path” );
std :: string cur path = lua tostring )( L, −1 );
cur path.append( ’;’ ) ;
cur path.append( path );
lua pop( L, 1 ) ;
lua pushstring( L, cur path.c str () ) ;
lua setfield ( L, −2, ”path” );
lua pop( L, 1 ) ;
return 0;
}
Listing 4 deals with system path programmatically, or
different paths the program searches. The operation is
dangerous and should be performed carefully. For example,
‘path‘ in this function may contain multiple paths separated
by ‘;‘. For instance, ‘/usr/share/lua;/foo/bar/evil/path‘.
Having an untrusted search path within the paths produces
the probability of arbitrary code execution with privilege
of the program and redirection to a wrong file potentially
triggering a crash. The vulnerability is called CWE-426:
Untrusted search path. For more on this vulnerability,
please refer to [56]. The search may lead to execution of
programs, which in turn lead to unusual or exceptional
conditions; i.e. CWE-754: Improper check for unusual or
exceptional conditions. Moreover, all the return values of
the functions in the code snippet are not checked. Thus, the
snippet also has CWE-252: Unchecked return values.
Listing 5: Set Byte vector to integer type - Answer id 41031865 in Stack overflow,
shows vulnerability due to out of bound read and the lack of checking the size of
the variable, (CWE-20, CWE-125, CWE-1019)
template<typename T>
static T get from vector(const std::vector<uint8 t>& vec,
const size t current index )){
T result;
uint8 t *ptr = (uint8 t *) &result;
size t idx = current index + sizeof(T);
while(idx > current index)
*ptr++ = vec[−−idx];
return result ;
}
In Answer 41031865 shown in Listing 5, ‘current index +
sizeof(T)‘ can become larger than size of ‘vec‘ due to CWE-
1019: Validate inputs vulnerability. In addition, when index
exceeds the limit, information leakage can occur or CWE-
125; the vulnerability ’Out of bound read’ is present.
Listing 6: Checks if string ends with .txt - Part of answer id 20447331 in Stack
overflow, all defined functions have vulnerability have fail if input string that
contain a null value, (CWE-158, CWE-1019)
bool ends with (std :: string const &a, std :: string const &b) {
auto len = b.length() ;
auto pos = a.length() − len;
if (pos < 0)
return false ;
auto pos a = &a[pos];
auto pos b = &b[0];
while (*pos a)
if (*pos a++ != *pos b++)
return false ;
return true;
}
bool ends with string (std :: string const& str, std :: string const&
what) {
return what.size() <= str.size ()
&& str.find(what, str . size () − what.size()) != str .npos;
}
In answer (20447331) shown in Listing 6 on how to
validate whether a file name ends with ”.txt” or not, this
answer includes code of functions and their benchmarks
for six methods in the original code snippet in answer post.
The vulnerability for other functions defined in this code
snippet is exactly the same as the two vulnerable functions.
However if filename in function includes a NULL character,
all of above methods will fail. This is a common trick to
bypass web application firewalls and file uploaders.
Example:
Validating ‘shell.txt\0.php‘ will return True for all of above
functions.
5 PROPAGATION OF C++ VULNERABLE CODE
FROM STACK OVERFLOW TO GITHUB (RQ2)
5.1 How frequently are the vulnerable code examples
from Stack Overflow copied to GitHub? (RQ2.1)
• Approach.
To detect the vulnerable code snippets that migrated
to GitHub projects, it may seem plausible to use clone
detection tools like SourcererCC [47]. However, the
most effective clone detection tools work only for Java
applications, e.g., Oreo [57]. The ones that can detect C++
clones only work at file or class level. For Java, SourcererCC
can find cloned procedures but the same capability is not
implemented for C++. The majority of vulnerable code
segments that we found are functions or a part of a function.
Therefore, we had to use some heuristics to search and find
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similar codes in linked GitHub projects. To find vulnerable
clones, we searched for the signatures of the code snippets
in Stack Overflow by looking at the sequences of keywords
that can uniquely find them within GitHub projects. The
used heuristics are explained below:
We take motivation from previous work [58], [59] and use
a rule-base approach to detect security flaws. We used
rules because unlike keyword-based searching, rules are
less susceptible to false positive [58], [59]. We select an
ordered sequence of keywords that with or without them,
the vulnerable code can be found within the linked GitHub
projects. For each code version, we chose a unique set of
words to identify that specific version in GitHub projects.
For example, to detect vulnerable GitHub projects that used
the code snippet shown in listing 1, we searched ’RAND()’
keyword and for older version chose RAND() and )-1
keywords. To evaluate this method, we randomly selected
five GitHub files from from the 69 vulnerable answers
and reviewed them manually. Every link to Github has
been tagged either with vulnerable (YES) or not vulnerable
(NO). This section was chosen as our BASELINE method.
We then run the our set of keywords using the discussed
algorithm on the 287 GitHub files, which reported whether
there is a vulnerability in the GitHub file or not.
We then changed the criteria for choosing the keywords for
the algorithm and chose the keywords randomly without
changing the number of words selected for each code
snippets. In order to select random keywords, at first the
comments of the code snippet has been removed, then
the code snippet has been tokenized. We then removed
reserved keywords from code snippet and only chose words
with more than three characters as a candidate keyword.
The following results are presented for two methods
(Chosen-Keyword and Random-Keyword) and compare it
with the baseline method.
Baseline-Method Label-Algorithm Chosen-Keyword Random-
Keyword
YES NO 34 51
NO NO 10 160
NO YES 29 41
YES YES 223 35
TABLE 4: Two Method Results
• Results.
For each method we calculate Recall, Precision, F1-Measure
and Accuracy:
RECALL= TruePositive
TruePositive + FalseNegative
PRECISION= TruePositive
TruePositive + FalsePositive
F1 Measure= 2 *
(
Precision ∗Recall
Precision + Recall
)
ACCURACY=
TruePositive +TrueNegative
TruePositive + FalsePositive + FalsePositive + FalseNegative
The most important weakness of the Random-Keyword is the use
of keywords that do not indicate existence of security vulnerabilities in
GitHub code. According to listing 7 the sequence chosen for Chosen-
Keyword is based on the fact that by navigating and searching ordered
keywords, the vulnerability was detected mean while in the Random-
Keyword method this criterion is determined without consideration
Fig. 13: Comparing Results for Two Method
of vulnerable part of the code and its sequence which will lead into
incorrect results.
Listing 7: Selected keywords from answer id: 4156038
!”Path”
! lua tostring(
Total count of GitHub files for 69 vulnerable answers was 2859 GitHub
links that has been showen in table 5 separated by CWE definition.
After run previous method, our algorithm found 287 GitHub vulnera-
ble files can potentially have security flaws. Samples of False-Positive
and False-Negative Chosen-Keyword heuristic and Random-Keyword
heuristic results can be found in online material.
TABLE 5: CWEs detection in GitHub Repositories with chosen-keyword Algo-
rithm
GitHub Count Confirm Count CWE Title
1539 4 CWE-835-Loop with unreachable Exit condition
703 37 CWE-20-Improper input validation
653 72 CWE-754-Improper check for unusual or exceptional condi-
tion
324 187 CWE-1006-Bad coding practice
250 5 CWE-158-Improper neutralization of null byte or null char-
acter
212 2 CWE-369-Divided by zero
151 141 CWE-150-Improper neutralization of escape, meta, or control
sequence
118 0 CWE-628-Function call with incorrectly specific argument
89 14 CWE-252-Unchecked return value
73 2 CWE-134-Use of externally controlled format string
54 4 CWE-476-Null pointer dereference
53 4 CWE-789-Uncontrolled memory allocation
41 12 CWE-477-Use of obsolete function
20 1 CWE-676-Use of potentially dangerous function
20 0 CWE-232-Improper handling of undefined values
14 2 CWE-121-Stack base buffer overflow
7 0 CWE-415-Double free
5 1 CWE-78-Improper neutralization of special elements used in
an os command
5 0 CWE-413-Improper resource locking
5 5 CWE-116-Improper encoding or escaping of output
5 0 CWE-193-Off by one error
3 3 CWE-682-Incorrect calculation
3 0 CWE-686-Function call with incorrect argument type
3 0 CWE-120-Buffer copy without checking size of input
3 0 CWE-131-Incorrect calculation of buffer size
3 1 CWE-710-Improper adherence to coding standard
1 0 CWE-426-Untrusted search path
5.2 How frequently are the copied vulnerable code ex-
amples fixed in the GitHub repositories? (RQ2.2)
We created a new web application to make the review process more
efficient and systematic. With the review system, we assessed whether
the vulnerable Stack Overflow code snippets that were migrated to
GitHub were either fixed or still contained the vulnerability.
•Results. Among 287 GitHub files that must be checked, vulnerabilities
were corrected in 34 files and other 253 GitHub file still had vulnera-
bilities. For instance as can be seen in Listing 8, the two CWE-789 [60]
and CWE-252 [55] were corrected.
Listing 8: Part of code was Fixed and improved in GitHub File for answer id
2654860 in Stack Overflow
//Improve and adapted version of http://stackoverflow.com/a/
2654860
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void save bmp(string filename, uchar4* ptr, const int width, const
int height)
{
const int num elems = width*height;
unsigned char* img = (unsgined char*)malloc(3* num elems);
int i =0;
.....
}
As shown in listing 9 boundary was limited and mentioned in
comments of source code in GitHub file and CWE-125 [61], CWE-
category-1019 [62] and CWE-20 [63] were corrected.
Listing 9: Code was Fixed in GitHub File mentioned in comment for answer id
41031865 in Stack Overflow
//check if we can read sizeof(T) bytes starting the next index
check lenght(vec.size() , sizeof (T), current index + 1);
T result ;
auto* ptr = reinterpret cast<uint8 t*>(&result);
for ( size t i = 0; i < sizeof(T); ++i)
{
*ptr++ = vec[current index + sizeof(T) −i];
}
return result ;
}
5.3 How did the GitHub developers react when in-
formed of the vulnerable code examples? (RQ2.3)
• Approach.
To inform developers about vulnerability in their repositories, a script
has been used to make an issue on the repository. The script has been
fed with our code review result. Developers have been notified with
information including:
• Description: The vulnerability in the code snippet is explicitly
expressed.
• Example: An attack scenario is provide to justify why the vulner-
ability is dangerous and how it may lead to exploitation.
• Mitigation Scenario: The mitigation scenario is included to in-
form the developer on how to fix the vulnerability.
• Reference: An authenticated reference is provided to show vul-
nerability is labelled based on objective and factual judgements.
• Results. In addition, a set of questions related to the vulnerability
with multiple choice or Likert scale answers were given. We received
15 response from 174 issues that were sent.
As shown in Figure 14 GitHub owner comments about existence
vulnerability in their code.
Fig. 14: User opinion about exists vulnerability in their code
Figure 15 shows the response of some users about vulnerability in
their projects. As shown in Figure16, the user’s opinion about the use-
fulness of the automatic detection of the vulnerability was discussed.
In the end, we asked the users about the best way to know about the
vulnerability shows in Figure 17.
Fig. 15: User response about security vulnerability in their
code
Fig. 16: User opinion about automated vulnerability analysis
useful for future development
Fig. 17: How inform developer of potential vulnerabilities
in code examples
6 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
Of the fifteen responses we received out of a 117 issues to the GitHub
owners, 40% pointed to the possibility of vulnerabilities in the code
provided their input data is not dynamic and 13.3% acknowledge the
vulnerability in the code but are reluctant to fix it. Most practitioner
agree to implement a automated security mechanism to detect vulner-
abilities in the code. They expressed the use of the browser extension
[45] and offline tool to run ad-hoc on Stack Overflow methods more
effective than other methods to inform users to vulnerabilities in the
code examples.
To inform users about existence vulnerability in the code, we have
developed a browser extension. Suppose that a developer needs to
create a random alpha-numeric string in C++ for their task in their
program. The developer searches in Stack Overflow for a possible
solution. The search shows a question with ID 440133 as the top match.
The importance of the question is determined in Stack Overflow based
on how developers perceive the question. This asker of this question
offered a bounty reward of 100 to the accepted answer. Consequently,
the question received many answers. The accepted answer (ID 440240)
has 263 scores (upvote - downvote) and it was viewed more than
174,000 times as of today. Therefore, a new developer looking for a
solution for this task is expected to be convinced to use the solution
provided in the answer. However, the provided solution has one of
the security vulnerabilities as we discussed in Section 4.2 (Listing 1).
Therefore, the provided solution, if used as is, will introduce potential
C++ security vulnerability in the developer’s software. Our browser
extension aims to prevent developers from reusing such vulnerable
code snippets, as well as to recommend them of better alternatives,
i.e., non-vulnerable code snippets in other Stack Overflow posts. As we
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TABLE 6: Questions asked in primary survey.
NO Question
1 Which of the following situation for our issue was true? (eight options)
2 Please justify your choice above (text box)
3 What would be the best way to inform developers of potential vulnerabilities in code examples shared in Stack Overflow (5-point
Likert scale for each opinion)
4 Do you have any other suggestions to design automated techniques to assist developers to handle security vulnerabilities while
using code from online forums? Please write in couple of sentences below (text box)
5 Could automated vulnerability analyses of code snippets in online forums be useful in your future development tasks? 5-point
Likert scale for each opinion
6 Would you like to informed of such a tool that could be developed in future? (3-point Likert scale for each opinion)
7 Get developers email address to expand the vulnerability detection tool (text box)
recall from our survey of GitHub developers, such a browser extension
was also desired by the survey respondents.
In Figure 18, we show a screenshot of our developed extension. The
extension gets activated when a developer visits a Stack Overflow post.
The extension consults our database of vulnerable C++ code snippets
in Stack Overflow to determine whether the provided solution in the
post is vulnerable. If the provided solution is indeed found vulnerable,
the extension then shows a warning message to the developer with
an explanation of why the code snippet is vulnerable (see 18). The
extension then recommends non-vulnerable similar code snippets from
other Stack Overflow posts, so that the developer can reuse those safe
code snippets instead of the vulnerable code snippet.
Fig. 18: Browser Extension for Code Snippet with AnswerId
440240 in Stack Overflow
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
We now discuss the threats to validity of our study following the
guidelines for case study research.
Construct validity threats: Concern the relation between theory and
observation. In our study, threats to the construct validity are mainly
due to measurement errors. We use the state-of-the-art clone detection
tool, SourcererCC [47], to identify similar code between the Stack
Overflow C++ code snippets. We use the tokenization at file level
in SourcererCC and set the similarity degree 100 percent to find all
exact C++ code in Stack Overflow all other setting have default setting.
So far, SourcerecCC has not implemented the block-level tokenization
implementation for C++, so we used our heuristic to detect vulnerable
C++ code snippets from Stack Overflow to GitHub that can miss
some vulnerable codes. Other concern is related to false negatives that
Syntaxnet [46] may have produced.
Internal validity threats: Any misrepresentation in the topic areas we
used SOTorrent dataset would effect our analysis. For instance, mi-
grated Stack Overflow code snippets that SOTorrent may have missed
to link to GitHub projects were automatically omitted from our analy-
sis. Moreover, several posts are not correctly tagged, so C++ snippets
that are not correctly tagged are also not included in our analysis.
These missed snippets would just extend our analysis to a broader
perspectives but does not have any effect on the results obtained.
External validity threats: Concern the possibility to generalize our results.
The findings in this paper was focused on Stack Overflow and does not
generalize to other Q&A websites.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed vulnerabilities in C++ code snippets
shared on Stack Overflow and their migration to GitHub projects.
This is the first study that address the security issues of C++ code
examples shared on Stack Overflow. We have investigated security
vulnerabilities in the C++ code snippets shared on Stack Overflow
over a period of 10 years. From the 72,483 reviewed code snippets
used in at least one project hosted on GitHub, we found a total of
69 vulnerable code snippets categorized into 29 types. Bad coding
practices, improper check for unusual or exceptional conditions and
improper input validation were most prevalent types of vulnerabilities.
The 69 vulnerable code snippets found in Stack Overflow were reused
in a total of 2859 GitHub projects. Information about the detected
vulnerabilities were presented to developers of the studied projects.
Although they acknowledged the vulnerabilities, many of them are still
not corrected today.
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